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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGAL 
ERROR IN COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AWARDS 
JAMES R. MADISON* 
One of the principal characteristics supposedly distinguish-
ing arbitration from litigation as a mode of dispute resolution is 
that an arbitral decision is essentially final - both as to matters 
of fact and also as to matters of law. 1 
* B.S., 1953, Stanford University; L.L.B., 1959, Stanford University; Member of the 
labor and litigation departments of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, San Francisco; Mem-
ber of the State Bar of California and the Bars of the United States Supreme Court, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the United States District 
Courts for the Northern, Eastern, Central and Southern Districts of California. The au-
thor gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe 
associate Matthew R. Lucas. 
1. Section 1286.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies the following limited 
grounds upon which an award may be vacated, all of which focus on the integrity of the 
process, not the merits: 
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other 
undue means; 
(b) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators; 
(c) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced 
by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator; 
(d) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award 
cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the deci-
sion upon the controversy submitted; or 
(e) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced 
by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon 
sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the 
arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by 
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California appellate statements are legion to the effect that 
arbitration awards are not open to judicial review on their mer-
its. 2 Since California enacted a comprehensive arbitration stat-
ute in 1927,3 the California Supreme Court has adhered closely 
to the tenet that arbitrator decisions are not subject to judicial 
review for errors of law. This standard follows from the Court's 
assertions that an arbitrator generally is not obliged to follow 
the law, but instead is free to decide cases based upon "broad 
principles of justice and equity.'" 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has deviated from this 
path on only three isolated occasions when it reviewed and va-
cated arbitral awards as "against public policy."l! One of these 
cases involved a McCarthy-era labor grievance arbitration in 
which the Court overturned an arbitrator's reinstatement of a 
Communist Party member.6 In the other two cases, both of 
this title. 
(West 1982). 
2. California courts frequently say, "in the absence of some limiting clause in the 
arbitration agreement, the merits of the award, either on questions of fact or of law, may 
not be reviewed except as provided in the statute." E.g., Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 
119 Cal. App. 2d 156, 186, 260 P.2d 156, 172 (1953). 
3. California has had a statute relating to arbitration virtually since the state was 
admitted. Stats. 1851, ch. 4. However, it was not until the 1927 statute was enacted that 
written arbitration agreements uniformly became specifically enforceable in accordance 
with the provisions of what have since evolved through amendment into sections 1280 et 
seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure. See Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., supra, 119 Cal. 
App. 2d at 180-181, 260 P.2d at 169 (1953). 
4. See Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers, .52 Cal. 2d 568, 589, 343 P.2d 23, 35 (1959); Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515, 523, 
212 P.2d 233, 239 (1949). Such a broad declaration of deference has prompted some 
lawyers to counsel clients against submitting disputes to arbitration. In other cases, par-
ties have tailored arbitration clauses in an effort to preserve access to the courts for 
review of errors of law. One of the techniques for doing so relies on section 1286.2, subdi-
vision (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that an arbitration award may 
be vacated if "the arbitrators exceeded their powers." With this provision in mind, par-
ties may draft an arbitration agreement which specifically limits the arbitrator's power to 
deciding cases according to the law of whatever jurisdiction is to be applicable. The re-
cent decision in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 3d 51, 82, 277 
Cal. Rptr. 694, 712 (1991), has raised doubts about the efficacy of this technique. See 
discussion at pages 16-25, infra. 
5. The United States Supreme Court has also endorsed the concept of refusing to 
enforce an arbitral award which violates some "explicit public policy." W.R. Grace & Co. 
v. Local No. 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). That 
this proposition is nota broad license to review awards, however, is clear from the more 
recent case of United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). 
6. See Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 790, 798-799, 278 P.2d 905, 911-
912 (1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) (award in labor grievance arbitration 
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which were decided on the same day, the Court vacated awards 
in favor of unlicensed construction contractors.7 
. 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court decisions, any number 
of court of appeal panels have felt free to review arbitral awards 
for errors of laws and,when courts disagreed with the law ap-
plied, awards have been vacated.9 
The rationale used to justify review of an arbitral award for 
error of law has varied. In some instances, opinions have been 
tailored to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 
1286.2, subdivision (d).l0 Under this rubric, a court first asserts 
that the power of arbitrators is limited to deciding the law cor-
rectly and then concludes that the arbitrators have exceeded 
their power if they err as to the law. ll Alternatively, a court 
which disagrees with an arbitral decision on a point of law may 
say that the decision was in excess of the power of the arbitra-
tors because the issue had not been submitted to them for 
decision.12 
directing reinstatement of Communist Party member "against public policy, as ex-
pressed in both federal and state laws"). 
7. Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal. 2d 603, 204 P.2d 23 (1949); Franklin v. Nat C. 
Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628, 204 P.2d 37 (1949). In Loving & Evans, which was a 4-
3 decision, the dissenting justices argued that, by submitting to arbitration instead of 
objecting to it, the owner waived its defense that the contractor was unlicensed. See 33 
Cal. 2d at 617, 620-625, 204 P.2d at 33-36 (dissenting opinions). The same justices dis-
sented from Franklin on the same grounds. The unique power of the public policy 
against unli«ensed contracting, as evidenced by the recent case of Hydrotech Sys., Ltd. v. 
Oasis Waterpark, 52 Cal.3d 988, 277 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1991) (unlicensed contractor denied 
recovery even though allegedly induced by fraud to perform work for which a license was 
required), undoubtedly influenced the decisions in Loving & Evans and Franklin. 
8. E.g., Webb v. West Side Dist. Hosp., 144 Cal. App. 3d 946, 193 Cal. Rptr. 80 
(1983) (confirmation of arbitral award for breach of contract affirmed, but only after the 
court reviewed and agreed with the merits of the arbitrator's determination that the 
contract did not restrain trade unlawfully). 
9. E.g., Evans Prods. Co. v. Millmen's Union No. 550, 159 Cal. App. 3d'S15, 205 Cal. 
Rptr. 731 (1984) (award required employer to hire minor under 18 to work in violation of 
federal child labor law); Retail Clerks Union, Local 334 v. Food Employers Council, Inc., 
85 Cal. App. 3d 286, 149 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1978) (liquidated damage award invalid under 
Civil Code § 1670); Allen v. Interinsurance Exch., 275 Cal. App. 2d 636, 80 Cal. Rptr. 247 
(1969) (error as to law on contributory negligence). 
10. Section 1286.2, subdivision (d) provides that an award may be vacated when 
"the arbitrators exceeded their powers." 
11. See Allen v. Interinsurance Exch., 275 Cal. App. 2d 636, 80 Cal. Rptr. 247 
(1969). 
12. See Cobler v. Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown & Assoc., 217 Cal. App. 3d 51S, 
265 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1990); French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 
3
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In other cases, awards have been reviewed without regard to 
constraints like those imposed by section 1286. A "manifest dis-
regard" of the law,18 a "completely irrational" decision14 or, as a 
recent opinion put it, an "egregious mistake"lli may be grounds 
for vacating an award. These cases seem to be concerned with 
how far an arbitrator has strayed from their concept of the path 
of legal rectitude. 16 
Some courts have reviewed awards and been willing to set 
them aside only when the court could conclude that an error of 
law appeared on the face of the award.17 However, the most re-
cent case observed that it made no sense for review to depend on 
whether an error was apparent from the face of the award or 
not. 18 
Although the Supreme Court cases characterizing arbitral 
awards as not subject to review for errors of law frequently have 
been cited in support of decisions upholding awards, these deci-
sions uniformly seem to have been ignored by court of appeal 
F.2d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). 
13. This standard, which is derived from the United States Supreme Court opinion 
in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), is that typically articulated in federal 
court cases. 
14. Lesser Towers, Inc. v. Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 675, 699-702, 
77 Cal. Rptr. 100, 115-118 (1969). 
15. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 3d 51, 84, 277 Cal. Rptr. 
694, 714 (1991) (hereinafter cited as PG&E v. Superior Court). 
16. As may be seen from the opinion in San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. 
v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961), courts have struggled to decide 
how marked a departure from the judicial norm will be tolerated. In the Saguenay Ter-
minals case, the Ninth Circuit considered degrees of error ranging from a mistaken view 
in whic.h the arbitrators "had not gone too far afield" to an error so "egregious" that "no 
sensible layman would be guilty of," id. at 801 nA, but concluded that more would be 
necessary to constitute "manifest disregard." Its formulation was arbitrators understand-
ing the law and consciously not applying their understanding. See id. at 801. An award 
resulting from such a decision would be the equivalent of an award procured by 'undue 
means.' See id. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 
(2d Cir. 1986), the court said both that an "arguable difference" about the law was not 
enough, but that the "governing law" must be "well defined, explicit and clearly applica-
ble," id. at 934, and that "manifest disregard" would exist when an "arbitrator appreci-
ates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle, but decides to ignore or pay no 
attention to it." Id. at 933. In other words, the error must be "obvious and capable of 
being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbi-
trator." Id. 
17. E.g., Campbell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 260 Cal. App. 2d 105, 67 Cal. Rptr. 175 
(1968). 
18. PG&E v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 51, 79, 82 Cal. Rptr. 694, 712 (1991). 
4
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cases in which awards have been reviewed for errors of law.19 
Further, although courts regularly recite that an exception 
to the rule of non-reviewability arises when the parties to arbi-
tration agree to reserve questions of law for review in the courts, 
it is rare to see any reasoned inquiry into the issue of whether 
parties have agreed to such a reservation. In one recent case, for 
example, after acknowledging that conventional appellate review 
of points of law was proper if the parties had so provided, the 
court leapt to the conclusion that the parties before it had not.20 
This paper surveys cases under California law in which com-
mercial arbitration awards have been reviewed for errors of law 
and proposes a coherent approach to judicial review of alleged 
errors of law in commercial arbitration awards.21 Both of the fol-
lowing issues will be addressed: 
1. When and how courts should decide whether parties to an 
arbitration agreement have reserved arbitrator decisions on 
points of law for judicial review. 
2. Whether and, if so, when and by what standard courts 
19. It is not clear from the opinions whether the court of appeal panels have been 
unaware of the decisions or whether they were viewed as not applicable. 
20. See PG&E v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 51, 66, 277 Cal. Rptr. 694, 701 
(1991). 
21. Because of the broad reach of Commerce Clause jurisdiction, see Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 24 (1983), many arbitration agree-
ments may be subject to enforcement under the United States Arbitration Act, 9 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et seq. (1980) (the "Federal Act"). Judicial review of arbitral awards for 
errors of law under the Federal Act is outside the scope of this article. It is governed by 
section 10 of the Federal Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (1980), and cases thereunder. However, 
California law will apply when the terms of an arbitration agreement that is subject to 
the Federal Act provide for California law to govern the arbitration. See Vol Information 
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 
(1989); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 3d 51, 65, 277 Cal. Rptr. 
694, 700 (1991). 
In general, this article is also not concerned with the review of awards in labor griev-
ance arbitrations under collective bargaining agreements. As California has acknowl-
edged, the review of such awards even in state courts is governed by section 301 of the 
federal Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) (1978). See O'Malley v. 
Wilshire Oil Co., 59 Cal. 2d 482, 486, 30 Cal. Rptr. 452, 455, 381 P.2d 188, 191 (1963); 
Screen Actors Guild v. A. Shane Co., 225 Cal. App. 3d 260, 275 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1990); 
Greenfield v. Mosley, 201 Cal. App. 3d 735, 247 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1988); Safeway Stores, 
Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 70, 83 Cal. App. 3d 430, 435, 147 Cal. Rptr. 
835, 838 (1978). 
5
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should review arbitrator decisions on points of law when the 
parties have not agreed to reserve such issues for review. 
1. Determination of Reserved Right of Review 
Conceptually, an agreement whereby parties provide for 
submission of a dispute to arbitration, but at the same time 
agree to reserve arbitrator decisions on points of law or, for that 
matter, issues of fact for review by the courts should present no 
problem. As has been recognized: 
The strength of arbitration is that it is not com-
pulsory but is predicated upon the voluntary 
agreement of the parties to arbitrate future or ex-
isting disputes.1S 
If the courts are going to respect an agreement of parties to arbi-
trate, there is no reason they should not also respect a reserva-
tion in such an agreement of the right of judicial review of an 
arbitral decision. It is, accordingly, not surprising that no Cali-
fornia case has been found in which such a reservation has been 
questioned.23 
The question, of course, is not whether parties can enter 
into such an agreement, but whether they have done so. What 
the parties have agreed to is, thus, the first question a court 
should address in deciding whether to review an arbitral award 
for errors of law. 
The issue is simple if the parties state in haec verba in their 
arbitration agreement that conclusions of law in an arbitration 
award shall be subject to judicial review or, even more clearly, 
that an arbitration award shall be subject to judicial review for 
errors of law. 
An alternative technique which has sometimes been recom-
mended by lawyers, including the author, is to limit the power of· 
the arbitrator or arbitrators under the arbitration agreement to 
22. Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp .• 119 Cal. App. 2d 156. 184.260 P.2d 156. 170-171 
(1953). 
23. Section 1296. which was added to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1979. provides 
that. if a construction contract with a public agency requires that an arbitration award 
be supported by law and substantial evidence. it shall be vacated if not supported by 
substantial evidence or if based on an error of law. What the legislature thought it was 
adding to the law by this provision is not clear. 
6
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deciding issues submitted to them in accordance with some 
specified body of law, for example, the law of California as ap-
plied to disputes arising in California between citizens of Cali-
fornia. The thinking behind this approach is that it gives a court 
a "peg" on which to hang judicial review, i.e., the provision in 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (d) which 
empowers a court to vacate an arbitration award when the arbi-
trators have exceeded their powers.2• . 
Suppose, however, that parties simply provide for their ar-
bitration to be "governed by the law of California" or that dis-
putes in arbitration must be decided "in accordance with the 
law of California." 
Such a provision does not necessarily mean that the parties 
desire to reserve arbitrator decisions about California law for re-
view by the courts. As has been recognized recently, the issue of 
applicable law IS distinct from the Issue of judicial 
reviewability.211 
The parties may want California law to govern the outcome 
of their dispute, but they may also be content to abide by arbi-
trator determinations of California law, regardless of whether 
the arbitration rulings are correct or erroneous.26 
Indeed, if the agreement to arbitrate is truly consensual, 
who is to say that the parties are not willing to accept the risk of 
an arbitrator being dead wrong on the law in exchange for other 
benefits to be derived from arbitration - privacy, finality, etc.27 
Even though a governing law provision does not necessarily 
imply reservation of points of law for judicial review, it also does 
not necessarily mean that the parties have agreed to forego such 
24. The efficacy of this technique has recently been opened to question. See PG&E 
v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 3d 51, 277 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1991). 
25. See id. at 82, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 712. 
26. [d., 277 Cal. Rptr. at 712. 
27. If the arbitration agreement is explicit in submitting an issue of law to arbitra-
tion with knowledge of the finality of the arbitral process, the losing party cannot com-
plain if a court refuses to review the resulting award. See International Bhd. of Team-
sters Local No. 117 v. Washington Employers, Inc., 557 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1977) (award 
of punitive damages for violation of state statute upheld in collective bargaining contract 
arbitration, when parties submitted issue of statutory violation to arbitration). 
7
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review. As may readily be appreciated, the parties may have de-
sired judicial review, but simply may not have expressed their 
agreement artfully. Alternatively, desperation may imprint one 
memory of the intent of an unclear arbitration agreement upon 
the mind of the side which loses in arbitration, while the heady 
haze of victory may blot out any such intent from the mind of 
the side which prevails. 
When one side is dissatisfied with an arbitral award and 
claims that a right to judicial review of errors of law was re-
served in the arbitration agreement, but the party supporting 
the award contends that the agreement reserved no such right, a 
court is presented with an issue as to the proper interpretation 
of the arbitration agreement. 
There is no reason why the dispute over the right to judicial 
review should not be dealt with like any other dispute requiring 
interpretation of an arbitration agreement.2S The only difference 
is that the matter before the court is whether to vacate an award 
or not instead of the preliminary issue of whether to compel ar-
bitration or not. 
In either event, a trial court should attempt to decide the 
question by utilizing the language of the agreement and the ca-
nons of construction to ascertain the intent of the parties.29 If 
the language of the agreement appears susceptible of an inter-
pretation contended for by either of the parties, the court should 
also consider extrinsic evidence in support of and in opposition 
to the alleged meaning.30 ' 
28. The ordinary rules of contract interpretation apply to an arbitration agreement. 
See Victoria v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 734, 738-739, 222 Cal. Rptr. I, 2-3, 710 P.2d 
833, 834-835 (1988). "Courts are not at liberty to shirk the process of construction under 
the empire of a belief that arbitration is beneficient any more than they may shirk it if 
their belief happens to be to the contrary." Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 
N.Y. 284, 299-300, 169 N.E. 386, 391 (1929) (J. Cardozo). 
29. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn., 177 Cal. App. 3d 726, 730, 223 
Cal. Rptr. 175, 177 (1986); Bergin v. Van der Steen, 107 Cal. App. 2d 8, 13, 236 P.2d 613, 
617 (1951). Another line of California cases holds that the purpose of the rules of con-
struction is to ascertain the meaning of the words used in the agreement, thus setting 
forth an objective approach. See, e.g., Brant v. California Dairies, 4 Cal. 2d 128, 133, 48 
P.2d 13, 16 (1935); Mission Valley East, Inc. v. County of Kern, 120 Cal. App. 3d 89, 97, 
174 Cal. Rptr. 300, 305 (1981). 
30. Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 37-40, 69 
Cal. Rptr. 561, 564-566, 442 P.2d 641, 644-646 (1968); Southern Pac. Land Co. v. West-
lake Farms, Inc., 188 Cal. App. 3d 807, 815-816, 233 Cal. Rptr. 794, 799 (1987). 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss2/1
1991] JUDICIAL REVIEW 253 
The trial court's conclusion will be subject to de novo review 
on appeal, unless it turns on the credibility of extrinsic evi-
dence.81 When extrinsic evidence is in conflict, any reasonable 
construction by the trial judge should be upheld.82 
The recent case of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior 
Court88 raised just such an issue. The arbitration agreement did 
not refer expressly to any right of judicial review. However, as 
amended by a prehearing stipulation, the agreement did call for 
the arbitral award to be in the form of a statement of decision 
complying with Code of Civil Procedure section 632.84 What was 
the intent of the parties? On the one hand, a statement of deci-
sion may have been required because the parties desired to re-
serve errors of law for judicial review. On the other hand, while 
the parties may have been willing to accept the arbitral award as 
final, even if wrong on the law, they may have provided for a 
formal statement of decision for any number of reasons, includ-
ing the desire to impose a discipline on the arbitrators' decision 
making process.86 
Instead of searching for the intent of the parties, however, 
when the losing side in PG&E sought to vacate the award, the 
superior court apparently jumped to the conclusion that a right 
to judicial review was reserved simply because the submission to 
arbitration set forth specific questions about the parties' legal 
obligations. The court· fell into the trap of supposing that, if ar-
bitrators were required to decide a dispute according to external 
law, they were not empowered to mistake the law and an award 
based upon an erroneous view of the law should, accordingly, be 
vacated because it exceeded their powers.86 
31. Conejo Valley Unified School Dist. v. William Blurock & Partners, Inc., 111 Cal. 
App. 3d 983, 987, 169 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1980). 
32. Parsons v. Bristol Dev. Co., 62 Cal. 2d 861, 866, 44 Cal. Rptr. 767, 770-771, 402 
P.2d 839, 842-843 (1965); Los Banos Gravel Co. v. Freeman, 58 Cal. App. 3d 785, 791-
792, 30 Cal. Rptr. 180, 183 (1976); Medical Operations Management, Inc. v. National 
Health Laboratories, Inc., 176 Cal. App. 3d 886, 891, 222 Cal. Rptr. 455, 458 (1986). 
33. 227 Cal. App. 3d 51, 277 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1991). 
34. Id. at 62, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 698. 
35. See id. at 82, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 712. As one authority put it, a provision requiring 
arbitrators to abide by particular rules of law in their decision may merely be "directory" 
and not a limitation on their powers. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION & AWARDS 794 
(1930). 
36. Id. 227 Cal. App. 3rd at 62-63, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 699. 
9
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The court of appeal set out to correct the error of the supe-
rior court's ways, but fell into a trap of its own. It began by 
acknowledging the established principle that: 
the parties to a contract may draft an arbitration 
provision so as to afford judicial review of ques-
tions of law.87 
In the event of disagreement, as in the PG&E case, it follows, as 
previously stated, that a preliminary issue is whether the parties 
have so provided. The court of appeal held that the superior 
court erred in concluding that imposition of a requirement on 
arbitrators to follow external law necessarily implied a right to 
judicial review of the arbitrators' decisio~.s8 Parties might pro-
vide for their arbitration to be governed by external law, it rea-
soned, without providing for judicial review. So far so good. 
However, the court of appeal then jumped to a conclusion of its 
own, namely, that the parties had not provided for judicial 
reVIew: 
The question here is what judicial review should 
be afforded where they [the parties] have not 
done so [provided for judicial review].39 
The court based this assumption on nothing more than the 
"common expectation" that, when parties agree to "binding" ar-
bitration "in the present day world," they expect the decision of 
the arbitrators to be "final. "40 In short, the question was not 
dealt with, as it should have been, by remanding the case for a 
proper determination by the trial court.41 
2. Standard of Review in Absence of Reserved Right 
The PG&E court went on to attempt the task of formulat-
ing a standard of judicial review of arbitrator error to be applied 
37. Id. at 81, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 712. 
38. Id. at 65, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 701. 
39. Id. at 81, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 712. 
40. Id. at 82, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 712. 
41. In all fairness to the PG&E court, there is no suggestion in the opinion that the 
argument of either of the parties focused specifically on the issue of whether they in-
tended in their arbitration agreement to reserve a right to judicial review. This may 
indicate that they simply did not address the issue of reviewability in negotiating the 
arbitration agreement. The court, thus, probably reached the correct result, but its opin-
ion obscures the analytical framework which should have been employed. 
10
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despite the absence of any reserved right of review.42 Its opinion 
dealt successfully with one of the principal incongruities in ear-
lier court of appeal decisions, i.e., making review available when 
error appeared on the face of an award, but not otherwise.·3 
However, like many of its predecessors, it was either unaware of 
or ignored the logic of the governing California Supreme Court 
authority.·· 
a. Supreme Court Decisions 
The genesis of the competing lines of authority concerning 
review of arbitration awards in the absence of a reserved right of 
review, at least so far as California is concerned, appears to lie in 
the early case of Muldrow v. Norris,·6 in which the Supreme 
Court vacated an award because the arbitrators had applied an 
erroneous measure of damages. 
The Muldrow court wrote, on the one hand, that, "under a 
general submission," i.e., one that does not limit their power so 
that their awards must be in accordance with external rules of 
law, arbitrators may decide cases "on principles of equity and 
good conscience."4e If they do, "a mere mistake of law cannot be 
taken advantage of."·7 To avail themselves of such immunity, 
however, arbitrators must render a "general" award, i.e., an 
award that says nothing more, for example, than "A shall pay B 
$ x."n 
On the other hand, said the court in Muldrow, "in all cases 
42. [d. at 84, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 714. 
43. See discussion at pages 41-51, infra. 
44. Neither Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515, 212 P.2d 233 (1949), nor Grunwald-
Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Bd. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 45 Cal. 2d 501, 289 
P.2d 476, 37 A.L.R. 2d 1349 (1955), which, as discussed infra, appear to be controlling, is 
cited anywhere in the PG&E opinion. The court's extensive survey of the historical de-
velopment of judicial review of arbitral awards in California simply skips over these 
cases. 
45. 2 Cal. 74 (1852). Muldrow was decided in an era when courts were hostile to 
arbitration. Thus, even though the parties had agreed in their submission not to appeal 
from the arbitrators' award, the Supreme Court readily entertained the appeal saying, 
"agreements of parties cannot divest Courts of law or equity of their proper jurisdic-
tion." 2 Cal. at 79. 
46. [d. at 77. 
47. [d. 
48. See id. A general award was again held immune from review in Peachy v. 
Ritchie, 4 Cal. 205 (1854). 
11
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where the arbitrators give the reasons for their finding," i.e., 
what was then called a "special" award, "they are supposed to 
have intended to decide according to law [as opposed to general 
principles of fairness and equity] ... In such cases if they mis-
take the law, the award must be set aside."49 
Shortly thereafter, in Carsley v. Lindsay, the California Su-
preme Court reversed a trial court judgment vacating an arbitral 
award.llo The dissatisfied arbitrant sought to uphold the trial 
court's decision on the ground that the award was "contrary to 
law and evidence."lIl However, the Supreme Court said that it 
was "not aware that an award of an arbitration can be im-
peached on this ground. "112 
Although the award in Carsley could have been character-
ized as a general award, as the term was used in Muldrow, the 
Court did not mention any distinction between a general award 
and a special award or between an error of law which appeared 
on the face of an award and one which did not. 
The Muldrow notion that an arbitral award may be re-
viewed for errors of law if they appear on the face of the award 
was revived in the case of In Re Connor. liS However, in Connor 
the proposition was qualified in that awards would not be va-
cated for "mere ordinary errors," but only those which are 
"gross. "114 
Again, in Utah Construction Co. v. Western Pacific Ry. 
CO.,IIII the California Supreme Court reiterated that an arbitral 
award "cannot be impeached on the ground that it is contrary to 
49. [d. at 78. 
50. 14 Cal. 390 (1859). 
51. [d. at 395. 
52. [d. Muldrow is not mentioned in the opinion or in the reported summary of the 
arguments. 
53. 128 Cal. 279, 60 P. 862 (1900). 
54. [d. at 282, 60 P. 862. This concept appears to have been drawn from Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1289, as it then existed, which made "gross error" a ground for 
vacating a statutory arbitration award. 
55. 174 Cal. 156, 162 P. 631 (1916). Curiously enough the Utah Construction Co. 
case is the only California case found by the author in which the parties actually re-
served a right of judicial review for errors of law. They did so, however, only as to one of 
the issues in the case. 
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law, unless the error appears on its face."5s 
A second requirement in some more recent cases that the 
rights of a party be "substantially prejudiced" surfaced for the 
first time when the Utah Construction court added that an 
award would not be vacated for error appearing on its face un-
less the error also "causes substantial injustice."57 
The tide in the Supreme Court turned against review of ar-
bitral awards in the wake of the 1927 enactment of a "compre-
hensive all-inclusive" arbitration statute which abolished com-
mon law arbitration. 58 An agreement to arbitrate future disputes 
has since been specifically enforceable, whereas before it had 
been regarded as "invalid and unenforceable, as constituting an 
attempt to oust the legally constituted courts of their jurisdic-
tion and to set up private tribunals."59 
Enactment of the comprehensive arbitration statute re-
flected a significant shift in public policy, according to the Su-
preme Court in Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S. T., Ltd.SO By 
providing for enforcement of all written arbitration agreements, 
persons were encouraged "to avoid delays by obtaining adjust-
ment of their differences by an agency of their own choosing."s1 
The Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. opinion also said it was 
clear under the statute that "the merits of the controversy be-
tween the parties are not subject to judicial review."S2 However, 
the Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. case involved a controversy over 
arbitrator fact finding and fact finding procedure, not whether 
the arbitrators applied the law correctly.63 
56. [d. at 160-161, 162 P. at 633. 
57. [d. 
58. See Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal. App. 2d 156, 182, 260 P.2d 156, 169 
(1953). 
59. w. H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 190 Cal. 665, 214 P. 38, 26 A.L.R. 1070 (1923). 
60. 29 Cal. 2d 228, 174 P.2d 441 (1946). 
61. [d. at 240, 174 P.2d at 449. 
62. [d. at 233, 174 P.2d at 445. Under the 1927 statute, the grounds for vacating an 
award were specified in section 1288 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are now in 
section 1286.2. 
63. [d. Courts of appeal continued to review arbitral awards for errors of law which 
appeared on their face. See Popcorn Equip. Co. v. Page, 92 Cal. App. 2d 448, 453-454, 
207 P.2d 647, 649-650 (1949); United Farmers Assn. of California v. Klein, 41 Cal. App. 
2d 766, 769, 107 P.2d 631, 633 (1941); In Re Frick, 130 Cal. App. 290, 292, 19 P.2d 836, 
13
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In 1949, in Sapp v. Barenfeld,8' the Supreme Court re-
versed a trial court's order vacating an arbitration award and 
remanded the case for entry of an order confirming the award 
despite a claim that the arbitrators had wrongly decided one of 
the legal issues put to them, to wit, a claim by the owner of a 
building for damage resulting from delay in completion of 
construction. 
The Sapp court held that the claimed error of law did not 
support vacating the award, observing that, "unless specifically 
required to act in conformity with rules of law," arbitrators were 
free to "base their decision upon broad principles of justice and 
equity."8t! 
Thus, arbitrators were free to· reject a claim which a party 
could assert successfully in a judicial action.88 Moreover, they 
could do so either "impliedly," i.e., in a general award or "ex-
pressly," i.e., in an award in which they said what they were do-
ing and why.87 No mention was made in Sapp of any distinction 
between errors appearing on the face of an award and errors 
masked by the general nature of the award.88 
The Sapp decision was followed in 1953 by the off-cited 
court of appeal decision in Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp.,89 in 
which the late Professor George Osborne, then on the Stanford 
Law faculty and later at Hastings, arbitrated a complex com-
mercial dispute. 
If there had been any error in Crofoot, it undoubtedly 
would have appeared on the face of the award. Professor Os-
borne exposed his reasoning in detail in 215 pages of findings 
and opinion leading to a five-page award. 70 
836-837 (1933). 
64. 34 Cal. 2d 515, 212 P. 2d 233 (1949). 
65. Id. at 523, 212 P.2d at 239. 
66.Id. 
67.Id. 
68. Id. Even though an extensive list of California cases involving review of arbitra-
tion awards was cited in PG&E v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 51, 277 Cal. Rptr. 694 
(1991), that court's research, like any number of other court of appeal opinions, either 
ignored or failed to discover this pivotal case. 
69. 119 Cal. App. 2d 156, 260 P.2d 156 (1953). 
70. Id. at 165, 260 P.2d at 159. 
14
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The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's 
order and judgment confirming the award. The court read both 
Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. and Sapp as rejecting the rule of 
Utah Construction Co. and concluded, accordingly, that: 
in the absence of some limiting clause in the arbi-
tration agreement, the merits of the award, either 
on questions of fact or of law, may not be re-
viewed except as provided in the statute. 71 
The statutory grounds of judicial review, of course, as then con-
tained in section 1288 of the Code of Civil Procedure and now in 
section 1286.2, do not include an error of law, whether or not 
appearing on the face of an award. 
The view that arbitral awards are not reviewable for errors 
of law was reinforced in Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for 
Women.72 The Supreme Court cited both Sapp and Crofoot ap-
provingly in Griffith Co., but, strictly speaking, the discussion 
was only dicta, as the Court concluded that the arbitrators had 
not made any error of law.73 
Another nail in the coffin of reviewability of legal error was 
driven by the Supreme Court in O'Malley v. Petroleum Mainte-
nance Corp.,74 whe~e the Court again affirmed a judgment con-
firming an award - this time in a labor grievance arbitration -
despite a contention that the arbitrators had erred on a matter 
of law.76 
71. [d. at 185-186, 260 P.2d at 171-172. The statute in question was California's 
arbitration statute as it had been completely redrafted in 1927. The grounds for vacating 
an arbitration award, as then specified in section 1288 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are 
essentially the same as now set forth in section 1286.2. Indeed, they have remained in 
large part the same since as long ago as in the earliest of California's arbitration statutes. 
See Stats. 1851, Ch. 5, § 386. However, the significance of the 1927 legislation was that it 
applied to all written arbitration agreements and thereby abolished the distinction be-
tween common law arbitration, which was relatively ineffectual, and statutory arbitra-
tion, which had previously been available only in limited situations. See Crofoot v. Blair 
Holdings Corp., 119 Cal. App. 2d 156, 180-182, 260 P.2d 156, 169 (1953). As recognized 
by the Supreme Court in the Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. case, supra, the 1927 statutory 
reform replaced a juridical hostility to arbitration with a "strong public policy in favor of 
arbitration." [d. at 184, 260 P.2d at 170. 
72. 45 Cal. 2d 501, 289 P.2d 476, 47 A.L.R. 2d 1349 (1955). 
73. [d. at 515-516, 289 P.2d at 484, 47 A.L.R. 2d at 1357. 
74. 48 Cal. 2d. 107, 308 P.2d 9 (1957). 
75. The arbitrators allegedly erred in Petroleum Maint. Co. in determining that dis-
charge of an employee was arbitrable. They said they were bound by a superior court 
order compelling arbitration of the merits of the discharge and that, if the question had 
15
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Sapp and Crofoot were cited with approval still again in 
Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Board, Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers.76 The late Justice Raymond Peters, who had 
written Crofoot while on the Court of Appeal, wrote for the 
Court in this case, saying that the arbitrators were correct on 
the law, this time in the reasons they gave for their award, just 
as they had been correct in Griffith Co., but that, even if they 
had not been correct, the award was proper, because, as in Sapp, 
"arbitrators may base their decisions on broad principles of jus-
tice and equity."77 
The Supreme Court reiterated its views once more in Morris 
v. Zuckerman,78 both that, after a matter had been decided by 
arbitration, the merits of the controversy were not open to judi-
cial review and also that, as in Sapp, arbitrators are not con-
strained by rules of law.79 
Although judicial review of alleged errors of law in an arbi-
tral award has not been before the Supreme Court in more than 
20 years since Morris v. Zuckerman, the Court has given little 
indication, if any, that it would depart from the views expressed 
originally in Sapp. Indeed, in a case reserving to the courts the 
question of whether an insured waived arbitration of an unin-
sured motorist claim by failing to comply with the one-year time 
limitation in section 11580.2, subdivision (i) of the Insurance 
Code, the Supreme Court quoted Sapp for the freedom given to 
arbitrators in deciding cases, as distinguished from the control 
imposed upon a court, which must apply the law as it is laid 
been open, they would have concluded that the discharge was not arbitrable. 48 Cal. 2d 
at 113, 308 P.2d at 13 (dissenting opinion). The court majority said, in effect, that it did 
not care whether the reasons were correct, because it was not going to inquire into the 
merits of the decision. Id. at 111-112, 308 P.2d at 12. This is similar to the rule on appeal 
from a trial court decision which reaches the right result although for the wrong reasons. 
"[AI ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely be-
cause given for a wrong reason." D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 9, 
112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 799, 520 P.2d 10, 23 (1974). 
76. 52 Cal. 2d 568, 589, 343 P. 2d 23, 35 (1959). 
77. Id. at 589, 343 P.2d at 35. 
78. 69 Cal. 2d 686, 72 Cal. Rptr. 880, 446 P. 2d 1000 (1968). 
79. Id. at 691, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 884, 446 P.2d at 1004. See Greenfield v. Mosley, 201 
Cal. App. 3d 735, 745, 247 Cal. Rptr. 314, 320 (1988) (J. Arabian). Although the Green-
{wid court reviewed an arbitration award for error of law, it actually reversed a judgment 
vacating the award because it concluded that no error appeared on the face of the award. 
Id. at 748, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 322. 
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down by the authorities.8o 
b. Court of Appeal Decisions 
If the Supreme Court thought that by Sapp it was creating 
an Eden of non-reviewability, the ink was scarcely dry on its 
opinion before the serpent began lurking about. Thus, in United 
States Plywood Co. v. Hudson Lumber Co.,8l while the court re-
lied on both Sapp and Crofoot to uphold an award against at-
tack by a dissatisfied arbitrant, it noted that no error appeared 
on the face of the award and buttressed its decision with pre-
Sapp Crofoot authority that an arbitral award would not be re-
viewed for errors of law "unless the error appears on the face of 
the award. "82 
From United States Plywood to PG&E, court of appeal 
panels have since vacillated in their treatment of arbitral 
awards. One line of cases has adhered dutifully to Sapp and 
Crofoot. For example, in Interinsurance Exchange v. Bailes,83 
80. See Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 473, 121 Cal. Rptr. 
477, 535 p. 2d 341 (1975). The Court did render a tantalizing decision in Orpustan v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 988, 103 Cal. Rptr. 919, 500 P. 2d 1119 (1972). 
This case upheld the requirement of "physical contact" as a condition of recovery on 
uninsured motorist coverage, but said it was for an arbitrator, not the court, to decide 
whether the physical contact had occured within the meaning of the law. What the Court 
did not address was how it would react to an attack on an award if it disagreed with an 
arbitrator's decision. The only case in which the Court actually might be said to have 
wavered from its stance is Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 398, 90 Cal. 
Rptr. 608, 475 P. 2d 880 (1970), where a purported arbitral award was vacated because of 
an error of law on the theory that property insurance appraisers are not arbitrators and 
their decision is, accordingly, not entitled to the same finality as an arbitral award. How-
ever, while sitting on the court of appeal, one current Supreme Court Justice apparently 
subscribed to the notion that an award may be vacated for error of law, if the error 
appears on the face of the award. See Greenfield v. Mosley, 201 Cal. App. 3d 735, 745, 
247 Cal. Rptr. 314, 320 (1988) (J. Arabian). Although the Greenfield court reviewed an 
arbitration award for error of law, it actually reversed a judgement vacating the award 
because it concluded that no error appeared on the face of the award. Id. at 748, 247 Cal. 
Rptr. at 322. 
81. 124 Cal. App. 2d 527, 269 P.2d 93 (1954). 
82. The United States Plywood court quoted both from In re Frick, 130 Cal. App. 
290, 292, 19 P.2d 836, 836-837 (1930), which in turn cited to Carsley and Utah Constr. 
Co., and also from Popcorn Equip. Co. v. Page, 92 Cal. App. 2d 448, 451, 207 P.2d 647 
(1949), adding emphasis to the quote from In re Frick. Interestingly, Justice Peters, who 
had written Crofoot, concurred in the United States Plywood decision. See also Samp-
son Motors, Inc. v. Roland, 121 Cal. App. 2d 491, 494, 263 P.2d 445, 447 (1953), which 
similarly cited Utah Constr. Co. and Popcorn Equip Co. 
83. 219 Cal. App. 2d 830, 33 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1963). 
17
Madison: Judicial Review
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
262 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:245 
the court cited the entire chain of Supreme Court cases from 
Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. to Grunwald-Marx in affirming an 
arbitral award.84 The court concluded that the arbitrator had 
erred in denying res judicata effect to a previous judicial deter-
mination, but said that: 
It is now the settled law of California that, except 
for the matters expressly provided for in section 
1286.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a decision 
of an arbitrator is binding, whether or not correct 
in law or in fact.Bo 
Other courts like Durand v. Wilshire Ins. CO.88 similarly con-
cluded that arbitrators had erred in applying the law (collateral 
estoppel in Durand), but nevertheless affirmed the awards on 
the ground that errors of law by an arbitrator are not subject to 
judicial review. 87 
Still other courts appeared ill at ease in going this far. Thus, 
while relying on Crofoot to reject the argument that an arbitra-
tion award should be vacated because of "manifest disregard" of 
the law, the court in Lesser Towers, Inc. v. Roscoe-Ajax Con-
struction CO.,88 suggested that the arbitrators woul<;l have ex-
ceeded their power if they had given a "completely irrational" 
construction to the contract at issue. 
Still others simply ignored the Supreme Court. Without cit-
ing any of the pertinent Supreme Court authority, the court in 
Campbell v. Farmers Insurance Exchange89 reverted to the ob-
84. Id. at 835-36, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 537. 
85. [d. at 834, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 536. 
86. 270 Cal. App. 2d 58, 75 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1969). 
87. Id. at 60-62, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 417. Numerous other decisions reiterated that, in 
the absence of a clause limiting an arbitrator's power, an arbitral award is not subject to 
review for errors of fact or law. See Golden State Lines v. Fox, 232 Cal. App. 2d 135, 412 
Cal. Rptr. 568 (1965); Olivera v. Modiano-Schneider, 205 Cal. App. 2d 9, 23 Cal. Rptr. 30 
(1962); B.S.B. Constr. Co. v. Rex Constr. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 327, 19 Cal. Rptr. 167 
(1962); Goosen v. Adair, 185 Cal. App. 2d 810, 8 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1960); Case v. Alperson, 
181 Cal. App. 2d 757, 5 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1960); Lauria v. Soriano, 180 Cal. App. 2d 163, 4 
Cal. Rptr. 328 (1960); Ulene v. Millman, 175 Cal. App. 2d 655, 346 P.2d 494 (1959); 
Harris v. Havenar, 169 Cal. App. 2d 531, 337 P.2d 832 (1959); Strauss v. North 
Hollywood Hosp., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 2d 306, 309 P.2d 541 (1957); Gerard v. Salter, 146 
Cal. App. 2d 840, 304 P.2d 237 (1956); Cecil v. Bank of America, 142 Cal. App. 2d 249, 
298 P.2d 24 (1956). 
88. 271 Cal. App. 2d 675, 699-702, 77 Cal. Rptr. 100, 115-118 (1969). 
89. 260 Cal. App. 2d 105, 67 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1968). 
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solete notion that an award will be vacated for an error of law 
which "appears on the face of the award and causes substantial 
injustice. "90 
The court in Allen v. Interinsurance Exchange91 injected a 
new issue by construing section 11580.2 of the Insurance Code, 
which provides for arbitration of uninsured motorist claims, to 
require that arbitrators abide by external law in deciding such 
claims.92 From this premise, it concluded that the power of arbi-
trators was limited to applying the law correctly. This gave the 
Allen court license to review the arbitral award under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (d) and to vacate it 
as in excess of the arbitrator's power when it concluded that the 
arbitrator had erred in applying the law of contributory 
negligence.93 
The fun really began with Allen. Cases like State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Guleserian94 and Lindholm v. Galuin91S 
remained faithful to the Sapp line.96 The Guleserian court went 
so far as to say that an award could not be vacated for an error 
of law "no matter how gross."97 Another court observed that: 
when parties opt for the forum of arbitration they 
agree to be bound by the decision of that forum 
knowing that arbitrators, like judges, are 
fallible. 98 
90. [d. at 111-112, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 179. 
91. 275 Cal. App. 2d 636, 80 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1969). 
92. [d. at 640, 641, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 249, 250. 
93. [d. at 640, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 250. The purity of the court's holding was diluted by 
the facts that the arbitrator acknowledged the error and the error appeared on the face 
of the award and also by the court's characterization of the error as "gross." [d. 
94. 28 Cal. App. 3d 397, 104 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1972). The Guleserian court labored to 
distinguish Allen as based upon the proposition that, "to prevent injustice," an arbitra-
tor has the power to correct error in his own award "within a reasonable but very short 
period." [d. at 403, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 687-688. 
95. 95 Cal. App. 3d 443, 157 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1979). 
96. See also Herman Feil, Inc. v. Design Center, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1406, 251 Cal. 
Rptr. 895 (1988); Santa Clara-San Benito Chapter of the Nat. Elec. Contractors Assn., 
Inc. v. Local No. 332, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 40 Cal. App. 3d 431, 114 Cal. 
Rptr. 909 (1974) labor grievance award confirmed, citing Guleserian and Bailes); Her-
nandez v. State Farm Ins. Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 255, 77 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1969). 
97. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Guleserian, 28 Cal. App. 3d 397, 402, 104 Cal. 
Rptr. 683, 687 (1972). 
98. That Way Prod. Co. v. Directors Guild, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 3d 960, 965, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 474, 477 (1979). The That Way Prod. Co. court ducked the Bailes-Abbott split by 
concluding that no error app~ared on the face of the award before it. [d. at 965-66, 158 
19
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On the other hand, in Abbott v. California State Auto. 
Ins.,DD the court reached the same conclusion as in Campbell. 
The rationale of the Abbott court was similar to that in Allen -
an error of law on the face of the award exceeded the power of 
the arbitrator within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision 
(d).loO The standard used by Abbott and Campbell in reviewing 
awards in uninsured motorist cases was later also applied to the 
review of awards in a real estate development joint venture,lOl a 
construction casel02 and a labor grievance arbitration. l03 Other 
courts reverted to the "completely irrational" standard of the 
Lesser Towers case.104 In one instance, different panels in the 
same district even differed over the extent to which arbitral 
awards are subject to review for legal error. One case cited Sapp 
in upholding an award, while the other vacated an award for er-
ror on its face. 1011 
Some courts seemed to feel that one way out of the dilemma 
between the two lines of cases was to say that it was not neces-
sary to choose between them because, upon review, no error was 
found in the award. loe At least two courts covered all the bases. 
In reversing the vacatur of a labor grievance award and confirm-
ing a medical malpractice award, respectively, these decisions 
Cal. Rptr. at 477-478. The court also noted that it was more restricted in reviewing a 
collective bargaining agreement award than otherwise. [d. at 966, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 478. 
99. 68 Cal. App. 3d 763, 137 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1977). 
100. [d. at 770-771, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 584. 
101. Hirsch v. Ensign, 122 Cal. App. 3d 521, 176 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1981). 
102. Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Memorial Hosp., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 213 Cal. 
Rptr. 62 (1985). The court here said that, in the absence of an error of law on its face, 
the award would be vacated only if it was "completely irrational." [d. at 1091, 213 Cal. 
Rptr. at 68. 
103. National Football League Players' Assn. v. National Football League Manage-
ment Council, 188 Cal. App. 3d 192, 233 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1986). 
104. Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney v. Lawrence, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1165, 
1171, 199 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249 (1984); Jones v. Kvistad, 19 Cal. App. 3d 836, 843, 97 Cal. 
Rptr. 100, 105 (1971). 
105. Compare Nogueiro v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 203 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 250 Cal. 
Rptr. 478 (1988) (medical malpractice award which was ambiguous in that it mayor may 
not have erroneously failed to apply MICRA limit on non-economic losses upheld, citing 
Sapp and others) with National Football League Players' Assn. v. National Football 
League Management Council, 188 Cal. App. 3d 192, 233 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1986) (award 
vacated because of substantial injustice resulting from apparent failure of arbitrators to 
apply mitigation of damage doctrine). 
106. See Park Plaza, Ltd. v. Pietz, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1414, 239 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1987); 
National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 3d 948, 229 Cal. Rptr. 
366 (1986). 
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observed first that arbitrators are not required to follow the 
law.lo7 Then they stated that, if arbitrators are bound by the 
law, their award was nevertheless to be approved if it was not, in 
the words of the Lesser Towers case, completely irrational. lo8 Fi-
nally, the courts concluded that, in the awards before them, the 
arbitrators were correct in their legal analysis. lo9 
In one of the most recent decisions, the court in Cobler v. 
Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown & ASSOC.,110 strained to find 
that the arbitrator's power was limited to deciding breach of 
contract issueslll and then vacated that part of an award which 
awarded emotional distress damages as contrary on its face to 
the law in a breach of contract case and, therefore, beyond the 
power of the arbitrator.ll2 
c. The PG&E Standard of Review 
As stated above, the PG&E court recognized the lack of 
logic in drawing any distinction between an error which ap-
peared on the face of an award and one which did not. Either an 
arbitral award should be reviewable for errors of law or it should 
not. 
One might argue that attempting to review awards for er-
rors of law that do not appear on their faces would raise poten-
tially difficult problems of proof. Granted. A party who wants to 
attack an award will not, for example, be able to use an arbitra-
tor's testimony to establish a point that does not appear in the 
award itself.ll3 However, other sources of proof will be available, 
107. Hacienda Hotel v. Culinary Workers Union, Local 814, 75 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 
223 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1985); Woodard v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group, 171 
Cal. App. 3d 656, 217 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1985). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. 217 Cal. App. 3d 518, 265 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1990). 
111. The Cobler court relied upon a clause which provided for arbitration of any 
dispute "arising from" this agreement as being narrower than one which provides for 
arbitration of any dispute "arising out of or related to" an agreement. 217 Cal. App. 3d 
at 530, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 875. 
112. Id. at 532-533, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 876-877. The court cited Sapp in support of its 
power to confirm the award in part and vacate it in part, see id. at 530, 265 Cal. Rptr. 
875, but ignored Sapp's broader teaching. 
113. Evidence Code section 703.5 provides that an arbitrator is not competent to 
give any such testimony. 
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such as a comparison of the award with a transcript, if one is 
made, or with arguments made by the parties in their arbitral 
briefs. The problems of proof simply suggest that, as framed, a 
rule permitting review of arbitral awards for error of law, but 
only when error appears on the face of the award, not only ig-
nores Supreme Court authority, but- subordinates justice to' judi-
cial convenience. 
The PG&E court purported to do away with the distinction. 
"Ordinarily," the court said, an arbitral award should not be 
subject to review for errors of law, regardless of whether the al-
leged error appears on the face of the award or not. 114 However, 
it 'could not resist the temptation to retain some power of review 
over arbitral awards other than that granted by Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1286.2. Thus, it said that an award would be 
subject to review if arbitrators made: 
such an egregious mistake 'that it amounts to an 
arbitrary remaking of the contract between the 
parties. lUI 
On wonders why the PG&E court expounded to the extent it did 
to reach this limited conclusion. It appears merely to revise the 
vocabulary used by previous courts without altering in any sub-
stantive way the willingness to review awards for error of law. 
Indeed, the PG&E court itself acknowledged the similarity of its 
formulation to that of courts which were willing to review "ut-
terly irrational" legal conclusions.116 
114. PG&E v. Superior Court, supra, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 83, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 713. 
115. Id. at 84, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 714. Although the PG&E court was dealing with a 
contract interpretation dispute, its "egregious mistake" standard would logically have 
equal application to a tort or statutory claim. 
116. Id., 277 Cal. Rptr. at 714. Instead of even mentioning Sapp or Grunwald-Marx, 
Inc., the PG&E court drew upon a passing observation in Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc. 
56 Cal. 2d 169, 14 Cal. Rptr. 297, 363 P.2d 313 (1961), a labor grievance case involving 
the same parties as the earlier Grunwold-Marx decision. The Posner case arose out of a 
petition to compel arbitration and did not involve review of an award. Although the 
Court said it was not going to adopt the then freshly decided Steelworkers Trilogy in all 
respects, its indication that it would not allow an arbitrator to arbitrarily remake a col-
lective bargaining agreement nevertheless tracked the opinion of the United States Su-
preme Court in the third of these three cases. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (award must draw its "essence" from the 
agreement and will be set aside only when the "words manifest an infidelity to this obli-
gation"). Because they normally take place in the course of an ongoing collective bar-
gaining relationship, labor grievance arbitrations involve special concerns that the arbi-
trator not stray from the contract. Indeed, collective bargaining agreement arbitration 
clauses frequently contain language to the effect that an arbitrator's power is limited to 
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d. The Proposed Standard 
If a court is going to start down the road of the PG&E case, 
why not go all the way? Assuming that Sapp, Griffith and Grun-
wald-Marx are still good law, and, as set forth above, there is no 
reason to suppose they are not, then there is similarly no reason 
not to carry the logic of the PG&E case to its ultimate conclu-
sion. If an arbitration provision is truly the product of agree-
ment between parties of relatively equal bargaining power, and 
if the parties have not reserved points of law for judicial review, 
why not conclude that they were prepared to accept the arbitral 
decision as final-right, wrong or indifferent, even if it flouts the 
law as understood by the disappointed arbitrant?1l7 
. After all, if parties to consensual arbitration agreements are 
unwilling to accept decisions of law as final, they first of all do 
not have to agree to arbitrate. If they do accept arbitration, they 
have virtually complete control over the structure of the process. 
They can specify, if they desire, such matters as the number and 
qualification of arbitrators, the time and place of hearing, the 
availability of pre-hearing discovery, the applicability of rules of 
interpretation and application of the contract and that the arbitrator may not add to the 
contract or modify any of its provisions. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local No. 759, 
Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 763 n.4 (1983). Except when com-
merce is not involved, as in Posner, labor grievance arbitration awards are governed by 
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, not by the state or federal arbitra-
tion statutes. See cases cited in note 20, supra. Although commercial arbitration prece-
dents may be helpful in dealing with labor grievance arbitration awards, United 
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987), the collective bar-
gaining situation is unique. See Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, 40 Cal. 3d 406, 415 n.9, 220 
Cal. Rptr. 807, 813 n.9, 709 P.2d 826. 832 n.9 (1985). 
117. Although it failed to follow its own logic, the PG&E court at least recognized 
that: 
if the disputed issue of law has actually arisen, the positions of 
the disputants are staked out, the consent to arbitration is 
then given with no reservation of a right to judicial review, 
and the arbitrator accepts the legal position of one side, the 
loser has no fair complaint, regardless of how egregious the 
error of law. 
227 Cal. at 83, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 713. Why should it make any difference whether the 
arbitration agreement covers an existing dispute or future disputes? Parties invariably 
must accept or allocate the risk of future changes in the law as applied by the courts, as 
well as unexpected disputes, whenever they enter into any agreement. They can take the 
same possibilities into account in judging whether to select arbitration as a dispute reso-
lution mode and how to structure the arbitral process, including whether to forego any 
right to judicial review. 
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evidence at hearings, the standard of decision of arbitrators, the 
manner of expression of the decision of arbitrators in their 
award and, of course, whether errors of law are to be reserved 
for judicial review. Parties have another opportunity to guard 
against a "runaway" arbitrator when they exercise their power 
to select arbitrators. Why give them still a further bite at the 
apple? If the legislature really believes that arbitration is an ac-
ceptable alternative to litigation, when freely consented to and 
conducted by a fair process, who are the courts to sit in judg-
ment on the outcome, no matter how repugnant it may be to the 
persona of the judge or judges to whom complaint of error is 
made? Isn't this simply an anachronous remnant of the histori-
cal hostility of courts to arbitration?118 
Apart from the difficulty of applying the PG&E standard to 
a particular case, the problem it poses is that, depending on 
whether an award is being attacked or defended, it may afford 
an arbitrant continued hope or concern that, if a court can be 
persuaded that the award is sufficiently wide of the court's mark 
on the law, it will be subject to vacatur. This in turn may lead to 
wasteful expenditure of litigating resources. 
The fact of the matter is that, regardless of the standard 
articulated, the efforts of disappointed arbitrants to overturn 
awards on the basis of grounds other than those specified in 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 are generally fruitless. 
Courts which review for error of law on the face of an award and 
also courts which review for a completely irrational award or, as 
118. To be effective in refraining from review of arbitration awards for errors of law, 
courts must also resist the temptation to manipulate the scope of the submission so as to 
limit the arbitrator's power to decide an issue with which they disagree. In Cobler v. 
Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown & Assoc., 217 Cal. App. 3d 518, 265 Cal. Rptr. 868 
(1990), for example, the court acknowledged that a clause which provided for arbitration 
of any dispute "arising from or related to" the contract would have covered claims for 
fraud or emotional distress, but relied on the phrase "arising from" alone to preclude the 
arbitrator from considering such claims and thus vacated an award of damages for emo· 
tional distress. [d. at 530-531, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 875-876. For a case in which the court 
avoided review by interpreting an arbitration clause broadly, see Taylor v. Crane, 24 Cal. 
3d 442, 155 Cal. Rptr. 695, 595 P.2d 129 (1979). Courts must similarly refrain from rely· 
ing on an error of law as evidencing bias or misconduct on the part of an arbitrator, as 
the court did in San Martini Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 
293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961). In short, no matter how tempting it may be to remedy 
a perceived injustice resulting from application of a rule of decision at odds with what 
the court would apply to the same dispute, a court should stay its hand. 
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in the PG&E case, egregious error typically find none.119 
3. Possible Exceptions to Non-Reviewability 
Should there be any exceptions to a rule which calls for 
courts not to review arbitral awards for errors of law, even if 
they appear on the face of the award and are flagrant? 
One possibility was recognized by the PG&E court itself -
that of awards made in disputes arising out of contracts of adhe-
sion. Another involves cases where the dispute is not submitted 
to arbitration voluntarily, but instead because of a statutory 
mandate. Still another includes disputes in which statutory 
claims are asserted. 
a. Contracts of Adhesion 
Just because an arbitration claim is contained in a contract 
of adhesion does not necessarily mean that it will be denied en-
forcement under California law.120 To the contrary, in the ab-
sence of some "special element of unfair advantage," an arbitra-
tion agreement in an adhesion contract will be enforced.121 In 
other words, if the arbitration provision contract of adhesion is 
regarded as fair, it will be enforced as if it were the product of 
negotiated agreement. 
The question arises whether the product of the arbitration 
process should be evaluated any differently when the process is 
embedded by one party in a contract of adhesion instead of re-
sulting from the participation of both parties. 
The PG&E court asserted that, if an adhesive arbitration 
119. The number of post-Sapp non-labor grievance cases in which awards have ac-
tually be vacated or remained vacated, after consideration on appeal of claimed errors of 
law, may be as few as five. See Cobler v. Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown & Assoc., 217 
Cal. App. 3d 518, 265 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1990); Abbott v. California State Auto. Assn., 68 
Cal. App. 3d 763, 137 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1977); Allen v. Interinsurance Exch., 275 Cal. App. 
2d 636, 80 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1969); Pacific Auto Ins. Co. v. Lang, 265 Cal. App. 2d 837, 71 
Cal. Rptr. 637 (1968); Drake v. Stein, 116 Cal. App. 2d 779, 254 P.2d 613 (1953). 
120. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 595, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 366, 645 
P.2d 1192, 1198 (1982); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 819-820, 171 Cal. 
Rptr. 604, 611-612, 623 P.2d 165, 172-173 (1981). 
121. See Keating v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal. 3d at 595, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 366, 
645 p. 2d at 1198. 
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clause is not invalidated, "then the consequences that attend ar-
bitration, including the limited scope of review provided by law, 
should obtain."122 
The PG&E court advanced two reasons for its conclusion. 
One was that a more rigorous standard of review would suppos-
edly give an unfair advantage to the ad.hering party. It could 
seek review of an unfavorable award; the adhesive party could 
not. The second was that the benefits to society from arbitral 
finality would be undercut. 128 
The first of these arguments was made without support. 
Even if judicial review for errors of law were made available only 
to the adhering party, the court did not offer any reason why 
that would give the adhering party an "unfair" advantage. After 
all, it is the adhering party which is compelled to arbitrate with-
out even an opportunity to participate in designing the arbitral 
process. 
The second argument presupposes an absolute interest in 
the finality of arbitrations. In actuality, by providing grounds for 
vacatur, i.e., review of arbitral awards,124 the legislature has evi-
denced only a limited societal preference for immunizing arbitral 
awards from judicial review, and this only when parties to a dis-
pute do not reserve a right of review. 12II The fact that society's 
interest in the finality of arbitral awards is limited gives rise to 
the next question, which is whether, in any particular case, this 
interest outweighs the interest of the disputants in quality of 
outcome. 
The real issue is whether judicial review and approval of the 
process as fair is the functional equivalent of or an adequate sur-
rogate for freely bargained-for consent. There are, of course, ob-
122. 227 Cal. App. 3d at 89, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 717. The court held that either the 
contract was not adhesive or that any claim based on its being adhesive had been waived. 
See id. at 86-87, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 715. 
123. Id. at 89, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 717. 
124. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1286.2 (West 1982). 
125. Courts have expressed more interest in the finality of a judgment resulting 
from confirmation of an arbitral award than in the finality of the award itself. See Rios 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 Cal. App. 3d 8ll, 137 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1977) (doctrine of finality of 
judgments barred subsequent suit based on allegedly fraudulent presentation to arbitra-
tor; plaintiff should have raised issues in petition to vacate award). 
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vious differences. Parties who bargain over an arbitration agree-
ment have the opportunity to tailor such matters as the number 
and qualifications of arbitrators, the scope of the agreement, the 
place of the. arbitration, and the arbitral procedure to their spe- -
cific needs. A fairness determination is rather more "quick and 
dirty." It is limited to whether the parties will have an opportu-
nity to be heard before a tribunal that is reasonably impartial. 
Are these differences enough to lead to a different standard 
of review? Arguably they are. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the policy in favor of letting arbitrants govern their 
own destiny is stronger when: 
parties of presumptively equal bargaining power 
have entered into an agreement containing a com-
mitment to arbitrate by a procedure of unchal-
lenged fairness. 126 
than when an arbitration clause is part of a contract of 
adhesion. 127 
It is not unreasonable to suppose that provisions for arbitra-
tion may be included in contracts of adhesion, not only to save 
litigating time and expense and gain privacy, but also with a 
view to obtaining outcomes that are more favorable to adhesive 
parties than in litigation. Adhesive institutions may expect, for 
example, that even though arbitrators qualify as· impartial and 
their efforts are unstained by misconduct, their views of the law 
will be more harmonious with those of adhesive institutions than 
the views of courts might be.128 This line of analysis suggests 
that courts should review the law applied in adhesive 
arbitrations. 
The obvious occasion for doing so is when a party objects to 
an award. The current combination of calendar pressure on 
courts and presumption in favor of enforcement of arbitration 
agreements makes it unlikely that objections to going forward 
126_ Erickson, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc_ v_ 100 Oak Street, 35 
Cal. 3d 312, 322, 197 Cal. Rptr. 581, 587, 673 P.2d 251, 257 (1983). 
127. Id. at 322 n.7, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 587 n.7, 673 P.2d at 257 n.7. 
128. The author is aware of concern among members of the plaintiffs' personal in-
jury bar, for example, that, as a practical matter, those who defend medical malpractice 
arbitrations have better access to arbitrator information than plaintiffs' counsel and, 
thus, are able to propose arbitrators who are intuitively defense inclined. 
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with arbitration is pursuant to an adhesive agreement will re-
ceive only cursory treatment. Although the usual presumption in 
favor of validity poses the same obstacle to an attack on the re-
sulting award, courts at the post award stage will be faced with a 
smaller universe of disputes to consider - in most cases, the 
parties will have settled or accepted the award - and the fact 
that an. award is final, whereas a referral to arbitration is prelim-
inary, gives more reason for deliberate consideration.129 
b. Arbitrations Mandated by Statute 
A more difficult class of'cases are those in which arbitration 
is effectively mandated by statute, such as disputes over unin-
sured motorist claims,130 or at least preferred, such as in medical 
129. Legislative concern about the adhesive nature of form real estate contracts and 
medical service contracts has prompted the enactment of statutes regulating certain as· 
pects of the form of such agreements. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1295, 1298 (West 
1982); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363. Contracts between consumers and health 
care providers or health care service plans mayor not be regarded as adhesive depending 
on the circumstances of their formation. Compare Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 
17 Cal. 3d 699, 710·711, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 889, 552 P.2d 1178, 1185 (1976) (not adhesion 
contract because health care service plan was negotiated by representative entity which 
could bargain effectively on behalf of the covered individuals), with Beynon v. Garden 
Grove Medical Group, 108 Cal. App. 3d 698, 706, 707, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150·151 (1980) 
(adhesion contract when no showing that health care service plan was bargained for by 
powerful representative). Even in Madden, the contract was said to have "some adhesive 
characteristics." 17 Cal. 3d, supra, at 710, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889, 552 P.2d at 1185. 
130. Section 11580.2 of the Insurance Code (a) requires that any policy of automo· 
bile bodily injury liability insurance offer uninsured motorist coverage which (b) provides 
for arbitration of any dispute between the carrier and an insured over what the insured 
is "legally entitled" to recover from an uninsured motorist. 
Arbitration is commanded by statute in several other categories of disputes in Cali· 
fornia. One involves construction contract claims against state agencies. CAL. PUB. CONTR. 
CODE §§ 10240 et seq. (West 1985). Another is any dispute between an insurance carrier 
and an insured over fees to be paid to the insured's lawyer as so· called "cum is counsel" 
for defending a case when the carrier is paying for the defense under a reservation of 
rights. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2860 (West 1985). Still another is attorney client fee dispute 
arbitrations. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6200 et seq. (West 1987). In addition, suits 
against local public agencies on construction contract claims involving $375,000 or less 
must be referred to judicial arbitration. CAL. PUB. CONTR. CODE § 20104.4, subdivision (b) 
(West 1985). 
Except for disputes governed by section 2860 of the Civil Code, the provisions of 
these statutory schemes regulate the arbitrations involved so as to vitiate the need for 
any court· devised standard of review. Section 10240.12 of the Public Contracts Code, for 
example, provides expressly for a court to vacate an award if not decided in accordance 
with the laws of California. Fee disputes must be submitted to arbitration by a lawyer at 
the instance of the client, but the client is not obliged to submit to arbitration. See CAL. 
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6201 (West 1987). This arrangement is to compensate for the "dis· 
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malpractice claims. lSI 
Uninsured motorist arbitrations probably have accounted 
for more arbitration decisions by California courts than any 
other single category of cases. lS2 Arbitration in cases like these is 
neither the product of negotiated agreement between two parties 
of relatively equal bargaining power nor imposed by one party 
upon another, except to the extent insurance carriers may have 
had more influence with the legislature than insureds. Both 
sides are bound to the provisions of the statutes. 
As discussed above, an early decision held that an arbitra-
tor's power in an uninsured motorist case is limited to deciding 
the claim according to governing law.133 Other decisions have 
been flawed by the "error on the face of the award" fallacy. As-
suming that the same standard of review should be followed re-
gardless of whether the alleged error appears on the face of an 
award or not, the question is whether the statutory mandate, 
like a fairness review in the case of an adhesion contract, should 
stand as a surrogate for a truly bargained agreement. The sheer 
volume of uninsured motorist claims and the relatively small 
parity in bargaining power" in favor of the lawyer on fee matters. See Manatt, Phelps, 
Rothenberg & Tunney v. Lawrence, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1165, 1174, 199 Cal. Rptr. 246, 252 
(1984). A lawyer and client may agree that any arbitration be binding. See CAL. Bus. & 
PROF. CODE § 6204 (West 1987). In the absence of such agreement, however, either party 
who is dissatisfied by an award has the option of having a trial de novo. See id. 
131. Section 1295 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been seen as encouraging the 
use of arbitration to resolve medical malpractice disputes. See Victoria v. Superior 
Court, 40 Cal. 3d 734, 744-45, 222 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7, 710 P.2d 833, 839 (1985). However, to 
the extent that arbitration of medical malpractice claims is the product of an adhesion 
contract, there is little basis for distinguishing between the standard of judicial review of 
the resulting award for errors of law and the standard of review in any other case arising 
out of a contract of adhesion. 
132. Uninsured motorist arbitrations have troubled the courts. Former Supreme 
Court Justice Joseph Grodin, who was then on the Court of Appeal, suggested after Ab-
bott that uninsured motorist cases might present a unique situation because the arbitra-
tion clause in uninsured motorist coverage "is the product of a statutory requirement 
rather than voluntary agreement." Rodriguez v. Keller, 113 Cal. App. 3d 838, 843 n.3, 
170 Cal. Rptr. 349, 352 n.3 (1980). Another court, which followed Sapp in a partnership 
dissolution case, suggested that application of the error-on-the-face-of-the- award stan-
dard was limited to uninsured motorist cases. See Rodriguez v. Keller, 113 Cal. App. 3d 
838, 843 n.3, 170 Cal. Rptr. 349, 352 n.3 (1980). On the other hand, still another court 
has expressed concern over what it saw as a tendency to review uninsured motorist 
awards more closely than others. See Feiner v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 6 Cal. App. 3d 540, 
546 n.1, 86 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181-182 n.1 (1970). 
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amounts involved suggest a greater willingness to accept whole-
sale justice in these cases than in adhesion contract claims and, 
thus, to forego judicial review for errors of law. 
So far as medical malpractice claims are concerned, al-
though it is dangerous to speculate on the cause of something 
the legislature did not do, its failure to provide pro or con in 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1295 for judicial review of errors 
of law may leave room for an inference of intent to leave such 
awards subject to review according to the case law. IS. 
c. Statutory Claims 
Two issues are raised by arbitration agreements which pur-
port to cover statutory claims. One is whether the agreement 
will be effective to preclude an aggrieved party from suing to 
enforce a claim based on whatever statute is involved. The other 
is whether to apply any different standard of review to the 
awards in such cases than in others. 
California courts have displayed a continuing hostility to 
any waiver by arbitration agreement of the right to pursue a 
statutory claim in court. When California courts have thought 
that the Federal Act was not applicable and that enforceability 
of an arbitration agreement was governed instead by the law of 
the state, they have not hesitated to conclude that a party can-
not be foreclosed from access to the courts to pursue a statutory 
claim. lslI The California Supreme Court has ruled that a plaintiff 
was not bound to arbitrate a state statutory claim even when it 
acknowledged that the Federal Act governed enforcement of the 
applicable agreement to arbitrate. ls6 At least one court has been 
134. See notes 129, 131 supra. 
135. See Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 35, 
43-45, 100 Cal. Rptr. 791,797-798 (1972), affirmed, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (Labor Code Sec-
tion 229 wage claim); Bos Material Handling, Inc. v. Crown Controls Corp., 137 Cal. App. 
3d 99, 111, 186 Cal. Rptr. 740, 746 (1982) (Cartwright Act claim). The potentially pre-
emptive effect of the Federal Act was not put at issue in Ware. When the Federal Act 
was interposed in a Labor Code section 229 case, the employer's right to arbitration was 
enforced, preempting the state law right of access. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 
(1987). 
136. See Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 592-93, 594-604, 183 Cal. Rptr. 
360, 364, 645 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1982) (Franchise Investment Act claim). The party seek-
ing arbitration in the Keating case was successful in obtaining review by the United 
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persuaded by the argument that statutory violations should not 
be insulated from judicial scrutiny by arbitration provisions in 
adhesive contracts. 137 
In earlier decisions, the United States Supreme Court also 
displayed a preference for judicial action over arbitration for the 
enforcement of statutory claims.138 However, the Federal Act 
tide has more recently turned in favor of enforcing all-encom-
passing arbitration clauses as against claims of right to pursue 
statutory complaints in court. 
The new direction was indicated initially in the 1974 case of 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver CO./3D in which the Court enforced an 
arbitration agreement because it arose out of a transnational 
transaction, even though the party resisting arbitration sought 
to pursue an implied right of action under section 10, subdivi-
sion (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.140 The Court 
characterized an agreement to arbitrate as a "specialized kind of 
forum-selection clause." Earlier, in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore CO./41 it had held that a "freely negotiated" forum selec-
tion clause, "unaffected by fraud, uridue influence or overween-
ing bargaining power" should be "given full effect."H2 
States Supreme Court and reversal on the ground that, contrary to the California Su-
preme Court decision, the broad right to enforcement of arbitration agreements under 
the Federal Act preempted state efforts to preserve access to the courts for particular 
claims, including, as in the Keating case, claims for violation of California's Franchise 
Investment Act. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The Franchise Rela-
tions Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 20000 et seq. (West 1987), which became effective' 
on January 1, 1981, after the time of the operative facts in Keating, expressly permits 
franchisors and franchisees to agree to arbitration of disputes between them. Id. § 20040. 
137. See Bos Material Handling, Inc., supra, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 110, 186 Cal. Rptr. 
at 746. 
138. See Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 
U.S. 36 (1974). 
139. 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
140. 417 U.S. at 519. The Court in Scherk accepted the premise that Wilko v. Swan, . 
346 U.S. 427 (1953), which held that an agreement to arbitrate future disputes under the 
Securities Act of 1933, would have barred enforcement of the arbitration agreement in a 
domestic setting. 417 U.S. at 515. However, it foreshadowed its decision in Shearson/ 
American Express Inc. v. McMahon, as to which see page 80, infra, by stating that the 
considerations which led to the decision in Wilko did not necessarily also apply to a 1934 
Act claim. 417 U.S. at 515-516. 
141. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
142. Id. at 12-13. 
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Scherk was followed by Southland Corp. v. Keating,t4s in 
which the Court relied upon the supremacy clause to uphold an 
attempt to compel arbitration of a state statutory claim. 
Keating in turn was followed by Mitsubishi Motors v. 
Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,1"4 in which a federal antitrust 
claim was sent to arbitration under an arbitration provision in a 
transnational agreement. 
The tide came to flood in Shearson/American Express Inc. 
v. McMahon,t41S and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American 
Express Inc.,t48 both of which compelled arbitration of domestic 
disputes involving federal securities law claims. The first of 
these decisions distinguished Wilko v. Swan,147 which in 1953 
had barred waiver of a judicial forum because arbitration was 
inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue. The second 
flat out overruled Wilko. H8 
Whether California courts will be influenced to recede from 
their historical position by the practical factor of calendar pres-
sures and the reasoning of the recent United States Supreme 
Court cases remains to be seen. 
Assuming arbitration of a statutory claim, however, what 
about judicial review of whether the resulting award applied the 
law correctly? 
We have clear hints of what the United States Supreme 
Court would do. For example, in Scherk, the Court said that, 
143. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
144. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
145. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
146. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
147. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
148. Overruling Wilco v. Swan does not necessarily mean that the United States 
Supreme Court will uphold arbitration of all statutory claims. In other cases it has con-
cluded that Congress intended judicial enforcement of statutory rights and that "arbitra-
tion could not provide an adequate substitute for judicial proceedings." McDonald v. 
City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984) (civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 
see also Barrantine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (FLSA claim); 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Title 7 claim). Gardner-Denver is 
the best candidate among these for overruling, because the dispute arose in a union set-
ting. In a similar case, the Supreme Court could regard Title 7 as imported into the 
collective bargaining agreement by operation of law, such that the arbitrator has the 
power and duty to decide the claim. 
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although it did not decide the question, "presumably" the al-
leged securities fraud could be raised in challenging enforcement 
of an arbitral award as contrary to public policy.l'9 
In addition, in Mitsubishi Motors, the Court said that, "by 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego 
the substantive rights afforded by the statute."1110 It also ob-
served that: 
Where the parties have agreed that the arbitral 
body is to decide a defined set of claims which in-
cludes, as in these cases, those arising from the 
application of American antitrust law, the tribunal 
therefore should be bound to decide that dispute 
in accord with the national law giving rise to the 
claim.lIIl 
And that: 
Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, 
the national courts of the United States will have 
the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage 
to ensure that the legitimate interest in the en-
forcement of the antitrust laws has been 
addressed. 1111 
The Court implied that an award which erred in deciding Soler's 
antitrust claim would be denied enforcement as contrary to pub-
lic policy.11l3 
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the 
Court cautioned that "judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards 
necessarily is limited,"11l4 but nevertheless asserted that "such 
review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with statu-
tory requirements. "11111 
149. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., supra, 417 U.S. at 519 n.l4. 
150. Mitaubishi Motors v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 628. 
151. Id. at 636-37. 
152. Id. at 638. 
153. See id. 
154. 482 U.S. at 232. 
155. Id. The Court also noted that "the SEC has sufficient statutory authority to 
ensu~e that arbitration is adequate to vindicate Exchange Act rights." Id. at 238. How-
ever, the SEC does not necessarily agree that the arbitral awards deciding securities law 
disputes should be subject to review for errors of law. See 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144, 21,151 
n.45 (1989). Industry representatives seem to believe that arbitrators are free to decide 
cases without reference to applicable legal standards. See Arbitration Reform: Hearings 
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The United States Supreme Court has not yet been con-
fronted with a claim that arbitrators failed to follow applicable 
law in deciding a statutory claim. Thus, we do not know whether 
or not the foregoing hints mean that an award deciding a statu-
tory claim will be subjected to a more rigorous review than oth-
erwise under the Federal Act. 
California courts have similarly not yet had occasion to 
opine on the standard of review of an arbitral award which de-
cides a statutory claim. However, it is difficult to suggest any 
reason why, if two parties of relatively equal bargaining power 
negotiate an arbitration agreement which embraces statutory 
claims and which does not express an intent to reserve errors of 
law for judicial review, the standard of review should not be the 
same as in any case not involving a statutory claim. As previ-
ously stated, a court should stay its hand. . 
On the other hand, one of the premises upon which the 
United States Supreme Court decided Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 
albeit possibly unrealistic on the facts, was that the parties were 
of relatively equal bargaining power. The Court went on to state: 
Of course, courts should remain attuned to well 
supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate 
resulted from the sort of ... overwhelming eco-
nomic power that would provide grounds 'for the 
revocation of any contract.'I&6 
The question arises as to whether judicial review of alleged 
arbitral errors in deciding statutory claims will be any different 
than otherwise when the parties are not of relatively equal bar-
gaining power, but the disparity is not so great as to justify 
avoiding the obligation to arbitrate. 
This is a subset of the general question of whether to mod-
ify the standard of judicial review when an arbitration agree-
ment is not the product of negotiation between parties with rela-
tively equal bargaining power, i.e., consensual, but instead has 
either resulted from a statutory mandate or been embedded in a 
on H.R. 4960, Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, 85-86, 138, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). 
156. 473 U.S. at 627. See also id. at 632. 
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contract of adhesion. A court should be willing to intervene to 
protect the statutory rights of the adhering party. 
4. Conclusion 
Courts should, of course, review arbitration awards for er-
rors of law when arbitration agreements provides for such re-
view. Moreover, as in the case of any other agreement, courts 
should interpret arbitration clauses in light of the parties' in-
tent. As may be seen, however, in the absence of a reserved right 
of review, California courts have not been consistent in limiting 
judicial review of arbitral awards to the grounds provided in sec-
tion 1286.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, sound pol-
icy considerations support the Supreme Court decisions which 
suggest that, at least when parties of relatively equal bargaining 
strength agree to arbitration, a court should limit any inquiry 
into the resulting award to the issues of fair process raised by 
section 1286.2 and should refrain from review of the award for 
legal error, regardless of how tempting the prospect of judicial 
revision may be. A different rule permitting review of arbitral 
awards for errors of law should prevail when arbitration is effec-
tively imposed by one party upon the other, as in adhesion con-
tracts, particularly when the scope of the arbitration agreement 
encompasses statutory claims. 
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